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CHAPTER 2 
A Wind of Change? 
White Redoubt and the Postcolonial 
Moment in South Africa, 1960-1963 
Ryan M. Irwin 
In July 1963, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk held a private meeting with Dr. Willem Naude, the ambassador of South Africa. 1 "A rough time [is] ahead," 
Rusk explained as the representative sat down in his office. "We are under 
enormous pressure but do not intend to give in." Several members of the UN 
African group states at the United Nations had successfully protested the prac-
tice of apartheid-South Africa's system of institutionalized racial discrimina-
tion-in the Security Council that year and pressure was rapidly mounting 
in the General Assembly for mandatory economic sanctions against South 
Africa. The ambassador looked across Rusk's desk and noted that it was "ironi-
cal" that ten years earlier they had been allies in the Cold War and now his 
country was being isolated in its struggle against a "common enemy." He went 
on to assert: "The United States [is] to a large degree responsible for releasing 
these revolutionary forces in the world. The goal of a great power should be to 
play down tensions and try to get people to talk together, but the United States 
without even opening its mouth [has] released dangerous forces in the world." 
Rusk paused for a moment before responding: "[I wonder] if these forces [are] 
not deeply rooted in the nature of man. [I wonder] if this discourse has not 
been going on for 2,000 years. Did not man, like most animals, not like to be 
pushed around too much?"2 
33 
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The secretary of state's comments were meant as a subtle jab at the 
ambassador, but they reflected the fact that new themes were reshaping how 
politicians approached international affairs. In many ways, the world was in 
the midst of a revolutionary transformation. Since the end of World War II, 
the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union had formed 
the parameters of world conflict and dominated global forums like the United 
Nations. For many American elites, the foremost accomplishments of the 
postwar era had been the solidification of US power in Western Europe and 
the Pacific Rim, while the greatest threats were the Soviet Union's domi-
nance over Eastern Europe and the rise of Communist China. The concept 
of containment seemed unassailable and few questioned the overriding 
importance of the Cold War. Under the surface, however, advocates for the 
decolonization of Africa and Asia were articulating a systematic rebuttal of 
this paradigm. With the onset of first -wave decolonization in the late 1940s, 
these actors gained a voice at the United Nations and established the founda-
tion for what would become the postcolonial critique. Rather than focusing 
on national security issues or great power politics, they placed precedence on 
the problems of white racism and economic exploitation. The Cold War, to 
their minds, was a diversion from the more important struggles being waged 
along the North-South axis. 
This thesis came into focus as dozens of African and Asian states gained 
their independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Concepts of sovereignty, 
freedom, and development-long defined in reference to European history-
reemerged as contested ideas in these years, with actors using discourses of 
human rights, racial equality, and nationalism to expand their authority at the 
United Nations. As Rusk surveyed these developments in the summer of 1963, 
he no doubt recognized that South Africa's internal policies were placing it at 
the epicenter of this new drama. The issue of apartheid not only monopolized 
debate at the General Assembly that year; it also shaped how the "2,000-year-
old" struggle of humankind against its oppressor was being presented to the 
world community. The choice between order and justice that subtly permeated 
Rusk's conversation with the South African ambassador, in effect, was a choice 
between the Cold War narrative of postwar events and the emerging story of 
postcolonial emancipation. 
This chapter examines the apartheid debate from an international per-
spective. Focusing on the brief moment between 1960 and 1963, it looks at 
how three influential actors-the African group at the UN, the US govern-
ment, and the South African government-framed the stakes and meaning 
of apartheid in the immediate wake of second-wave or African decoloniza-
tion. Sitting at the nexus of Cold War politics and decolonization, apartheid 
was the quintessential border of the postcolonial decade. For symbolic and 
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political reasons, each side in this story tried to police, reconceptualize, and 
control legitimate forms of knowledge about South Africa. As this contest 
unfolded, the apartheid question became a microcosm of the postcolonial 
era, revealing the deep-seated differences between actors in the First and 
Third Worlds, as well as the paradoxical nature of change in the late twenti-
eth century. 
In explicating this story, this chapter forwards three interlocking argu-
ments. First, resistance to apartheid subtly influenced how anticolonial 
sentiment was expressed in the years after decolonization. Couched in the 
language of Third World nationalism and Cold War neutrality, the actions 
of African nation-states vis-a-vis South Africa did not illustrate political 
immaturity, but rather a latent effort to reconstitute global politics in ways 
that embraced universal human rights and nonracialism. Black national-
ists, quite literally, used their influence in the United Nations to broaden 
the definition oflegitimate international behavior. Second, the United States 
reacted to these efforts with an agenda born from the Cold War. America's 
own national myth worked in conjunction with the UN Charter to buttress 
anti-apartheid efforts on a rhetorical level, but US officials were always more 
concerned with maintaining America's hegemony at the United Nations than 
with confronting racism in South Africa. Finally, as world opinion turned 
definitively against the Nationalist government in the early 1960s, Afrikaner 
elites tried retooling their country's image in ways that transcended debate 
at the UN and strengthened ties with Western nations. Their efforts were 
not entirely successful, but they did expose important connections between 
older forms of racial paternalism and the new discourse of modernization in 
the post-World War II years. 
When taken together, these points offer insight on the complex relation-
ship between the Cold War and decolonization. The African bloc's inability 
to elicit support for economic sanctions was tied most directly to the diver-
gence between its political goals and the security and economic priorities of 
Western policy makers. Equally important, however, was the shifting nature 
of political space in the postcolonial moment. As African elites grew more 
adept at using their numbers to shape discourse at the United Nations, US 
leaders began to pull away subtly from the organization and the idea that it 
could be a bulwark of American global power. This shift-and the under-
lying attitudes that supported it-both eroded the tentative authority of new 
nation-states at the international level and opened the door for subsequent 
South African propaganda initiatives at the nonstate level. Although the 
language of empire changed undeniably in the postcolonial years, global 
politics continued to reflect and reinforce older forms of pan-European 
hegemony. 
~---~-------------L 
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Internationalizing Apartheid 
On January 27, 1960, the British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, arrived in 
the Union of South Africa to deliver a stern message. Having spent much of the 
late 1950s managing decolonization movements within the British Common-
wealth, he sought to warn the white population of South Africa that a "wind of 
change" was blowing through their continent. Speaking before a special joint 
session of Parliament on February 3, he argued: "Whether we like it or not, 
[the] growth of [African] national consciousness is a political fact. We must all 
accept it as a fact. Our national policies must take account of it." Macmillan 
went on to explain that the world was being divided into three groups, with 
the Western powers and Communists now competing to garner loyalty from 
newly independent nonwhite peoples. In his words, "The great issue in this 
second half of the twentieth century is whether the uncommitted peoples of 
Asia and Africa will swing to the east or to the west." When placed against 
this backdrop, the situation in South Africa was becoming vitally important. 
"It is the basic principle for our modern Commonwealth that we respect each 
other's sovereignty in matters of internal policy," Macmillan declared. "[But] 
we must recognize that, in this shrinking world in which we live today, the 
internal policies of one nation may have effects outside it."3 The British prime 
minister, in short, was asking the Union of South Africa to recognize that it 
was becoming a liability to the West in the postcolonial era of world politics. 
Macmillan's words reverberated throughout South African society. Since 
gaining its independence in 1910, the Union had worked from the assumption 
that its position among the Western powers was unassailable. The basis of this 
partnership, in the minds of many South African elites, was the inherent supe-
riority of white civilization and a common commitment to racial paternal-
ism. As European countries like France and Great Britain relinquished control 
of their colonial holdings in Africa and Asia, however, these twin principles 
receded from global discourse. In their place emerged concepts of develop-
ment, universal equality, and political self-determination.4 Although India and 
other Asian states subjected the Nationalist government to criticism as early as 
1946, its economic and strategic niche in the Cold War alliance system insu-
lated it from concrete action through the 1950s.5 
Macmillan's speech was interpreted widely as the harbinger of major 
change. "South Africa can only have one answer to this challenge," contended 
Cape Town's Die Burger the day after the British prime minister's speech. "We 
cannot hand over any part of Africa for which we are responsible .... The 
state of emergency we have been plunged into by Western panic can only be 
fought with united forces. It is a struggle for civilization."6 As a colonial nation 
in an increasingly postcolonial world, South Africa had essentially reached a 
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crossroads between nonracial reform and continued minority domination. Its 
response was made clear in mid-February, when South African prime minister 
Hendrik F. Verwoerd publicly declared: "The world is suffering from a psy-
chosis which makes it think only of the brown and black man and disregard 
the role of the White man." Claiming that Western countries were "sacrificing 
their only real and stable friend ... for something that will not succeed," Ver-
woerd emphatically concluded that there would be "no mixing of the races."7 
South Africa's decision to embrace white domination was born from 
policies dating back to 1948. Capitalizing on a general climate of anxiety 
after World War II, the Afrikaner Nationalist party had achieved electoral 
supremacy that year by explicitly promising to reinforce laws that segregated 
the country's various ethnic groups." While Macmillan conceptualized the 
dilemma of decolonization through the lens of the Cold War, most white 
South Africans were more concerned with the concrete task of holding on to 
political and economic power in the Union. On a basic level, apartheid institu-
tionalized state control over the movement of black African laborers in white 
urban centers. After 1948, the government invested enormous state resources 
in robbing nonwhites of their remaining civil liberties, criminalizing various 
forms of labor activism, and forcing black Africans into overcrowded ghettos 
at the outskirts of cities. To support these programs, the Nationalist party not 
only expanded the government's military capabilities, but also forced blacks to 
carry identification cards whenever they left local townships to work in indus-
trial centers. 
Dissatisfaction among black South Africans exploded only a month after 
Macmillan departed the country in early 1960. On March 21, twenty thousand 
Africans surrounded a small police station in the township of Sharpeville and 
demanded to be arrested for not carrying their travel passes. Led by a political 
group called the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and inspired by the lessons 
of India's independence, they hoped to overflow South Africa's jails and pro-
voke a crisis within the government. The police responded by opening fire on 
the crowd. Within a half hour, sixty-seven people were killed and nearly two 
hundred were injured.9 
The Sharpeville Massacre triggered a sense of panic within the National-
ist party. Acknowledging that the protests were only one part of a nationwide 
upheaval involving hundreds of thousands of Africans, the minister of justice 
declared a state of emergency on March 22 and warned ominously that the coun-
try was on the brink of a race revolution. Mass arrests occurred in the following 
weeks as riots spread throughout the country.10 Standing before the House of 
Assembly a week after the initial outburst, Prime Minister Verwoerd explained: 
"These disturbances we are experiencing must be seen against the background 
... of similar occurrences in this country, in the whole of Africa, and around 
l 
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the world."11 The "wind of change" that Macmillan had described had arrived 
on the shores of South Africa. And the Union's response was dramatically clear. 
Language of Dissent 
The protests were indeed closely related to broader changes in African politics 
during the postwar era. For over five decades, the dominant nonwhite political 
organization in the Union of South Africa was the African National Congress 
(ANC). Subscribing to a nonracial social platform, the group worked steadily 
to unite the country's various blacks, Indians, and Coloreds under an inclusive 
political bannerY In 1959, Robert Sobukwe, an activist from Johannesburg, 
created the Pan Africanist Congress to challenge directly the ANC's leadership 
position in South Africa. His goal was straightforward-to incorporate more 
confrontational methods into the struggle against the Nationalist party and 
accelerate the assault on apartheid. But the language he used to frame these 
efforts broke radically with ANC dogma. Arguing that "government must be 
of the African, by the African, and for the African," the PAC explicitly rejected 
the utility of cooperation between racial groups and declared that black Afri-
cans would have "complete political independence by 1963."11 
The assertiveness and race consciousness of this platform was tied closely 
to developments occurring in the rest of Africa. Sobukwe was keenly in tune 
with the ideas of political leaders like Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah. 
The independence of Ghana in 1957, in many ways, legitimized the political 
demands of other African territories and spread Nkrumah's unique version 
of African nationalism through intellectual circles in the late 1950s. Linked 
with pan-African ideas of an older generation of diaspora intellectuals like 
W. E. B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey, African nationalism provided alan-
guage to address the challenges of postcolonialism in ways that were uniquely 
African. 14 For Sobukwe and his supporters, it provided "the only liberatory 
creed" that could "weld the illiterate and semi-literate masses ... into a solid, 
disciplined and united fighting force; provide them with a loyalty higher than 
that of the tribe; and give formal expression to their desire to be a nation." 15 
As an ideological framework, African nationalism had two parts. Domes-
tically, its advocates embraced the fair distribution of wealth through society 
and government investment in local infrastructures. "What other countries 
have taken three hundred years or more to achieve, a once dependent ter-
ritory must try to accomplish in a generation if it is to survive," Nkrumah 
explained in the mid-1950s. "Capitalism is a difficult system for a newly inde-
pendent nation, hence the need for a more socialistic society."16 The goal was 
not to reject the tenets of modern industrialism, but to remedy the problems of 
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underdevelopment in ways that strengthened communities and rejected eco-
nomic exploitation. African nationalists hoped to promote development by 
balancing the needs of urban industrialism with their own mythic, precolonial 
African past. As Sobukwe explained at the PAC's Inaugural Conference, Afri-
can nationalists would borrow the "best from the East" and "the best from 
the West" while "retain[ing] and maintain[ing]" the continent's "distinctive 
personality."17 
At the international level, anticolonialism was the conceptual linchpin of 
African nationalism. According to Nkrumah, "[Africa's] safety [could] not be 
assured until the last vestiges of colonialism [were] swept from Africa." Politi-
cal independence was the gateway to economic and social progress. Ghana's 
foreign minister, Alex Quiason-Sackey, tied this theme directly to the super-
power struggle: "Colonialism is the source of all the troubles which afflict 
mankind in our age. It is the root cause of the desire to possess arms. Therefore, 
it is the root cause of the arms race and the problem of disarmament."1x Rather 
than locating global turmoil in the subversive nature of Communism or the 
political economy of capitalism, African nationalists focused on the dangers of 
white colonialism. This racialized explanation of power was ubiquitous in the 
years surrounding decolonization. By flattening visions of the pan-European 
world (in ways that ironically mirrored the intellectual processes discussed in 
Edward Said's Orienta/ism), it buttressed the larger political project known as 
the Third World. 1Y 
The year 1960 was a moment of confluence. The Sharpeville Massacre 
occurred just as thirteen new African states emerged onto the global stage. 
While countries like India had criticized the Union's treatment oflndians and 
other nonwhites through much of the 1950s, decolonization opened space for 
a more forceful confrontation with the South African government. 2° For many 
of these African states, the system of apartheid represented a direct affront 
to the very notion of black liberation. Not only did it blatantly exploit Afri-
cans for economic advancement, but also it embraced the logic and methods 
of colonial domination. By modernizing the methods of white domination, the 
Union essentially positioned itself as the chief antagonist of the burgeoning 
African nationalist movement. 
Young South African activists in the PAC and ANC rallied to the idea that 
their struggle was at the forefront of a worldwide revolution. "The beginning 
of the end of an era has begun," claimed the ANC's Congress Voice in 1960. 
"The day for which the oppressed and exploited people throughout the world 
have yearned and struggled so long, has at long last arrived .... [W]ith the 
recent accession of thirteen new independent African states ... the [United 
Nations], which up to [now] has been a stronghold of the big imperialists and 
colonial powers, has now become the stronghold of the anticolonial forces."2 ' 
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Believing that they could garner support for international sanctions by expos-
ing the brutality of the Nationalist regime, the ANC and PAC put aside many 
of their differences in the months after Sharpeville and sent foreign repre-
sentatives abroad. As they established offices in Cairo, Accra, Dar es Saalam, 
London, and New York, both organizations exhibited newfound confidence in 
the potential for change in South AfricaY 
This energy was also captured in a speech by Kwame Nkrumah before the 
UN General Assembly in September. Introduced by W. E. B. DuBois as "the 
undisputed voice of Africa," Nkrumah claimed that "the United Nations [was] 
the only organization that [held] out any hope for the future of mankind." 
Although "the flowing tide of African nationalism" had the potential to "sweep 
away" everything in its path, new African nations wanted only to eliminate 
colonialism on their continent. Referring specifically to South Africa, the Gha-
naian president argued, "The interest of humanity compels every nation to 
take steps against such inhuman policy and barbarity and to act in concert to 
eliminate it from the world."23 The events at Sharpeville were tragic, but they 
provided evidence that the "wall of intense hate" that protected South Africa 
was beginning to crumble. 
The time for change had arrived. 
The American Pivot 
As the most powerful member of the Western bloc and the dominant state at 
the United Nations, the United States played an important role in determining 
whether African nationalist demands would actually affect the government of 
South Africa. In late 1958, the Union's foreign minister, Eric Louw, acknowl-
edged to the American ambassador: "I wish to be frank. A specific and strong 
resolution against South Africa voted for by a majority of nations in [the] U.N. 
does not matter so much as one might expect. What matters more than ... all 
other votes put together is [the position] of [the] U.S. in view of its predomi-
nant position of leadership in [the] Western world."24 As new African states 
gained their independence in 1960 and railed at the United Nations against the 
system of apartheid, Louw's statement grew increasingly relevant. Functioning 
as the pivot between the old colonial order that South Africa supposedly epito-
mized and the new visions of world order that African nationalists embraced, 
the approach of American policy makers became tremendously important in 
the early 1960s. Although the United States viewed the African continent as 
peripheral to its Cold War interests, its policies nonetheless shaped the bound-
aries of the debate on apartheid. 
The American approach was both conflicted and complex. On the one 
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hand, the United States had important political and financial investments in 
the Union. A report from the early 1960s explained the economic importance 
of South Africa: "The international standing of the U.S. dollar and, by exten-
sion, the stability of the integrated Western monetary system, is to a degree 
dependent on the orderly marketing of gold." South Africa accounted for 
about 65 percent of the Western bloc's gold production, the loss of which could 
put considerable strains on the US gold supply and the integrated Western 
monetary system.25 When placed against the backdrop of the establishment 
of a NASA tracking station in 1960 and nearly $600 million worth of private 
American investment in the Union, these ties represented tangible and sub-
stantial links between the United States and South Africa.26 
On the other hand, US leaders were cognizant that these ties might affect 
America's containment strategy in Africa. In discussing the issue at the first 
tripartite talks on Africa between the United States, Great Britain, and France 
in 1959, one participant stated: "In the world-wide political and strategic con-
text, Africa is both a prize and a battlefield. If the Communists occupy or infil-
trate too many countries we will lose the Battle for the Atlantic, Europe will be 
in danger, our communications in the Far East will be cut, and we will lose a 
tremendous source of raw materials."27 While not all American policy makers 
agreed with such vaguely threatening assessments, they recognized that South 
Africa was "one of the West's greatest propaganda liabilities" in the new era of 
decolonization because it embodied "the most flagrant kind of 'colonialism.' "2B 
Stated plainly, the United States viewed the debate over South Africa through 
the lens of the Cold War. South Africa's racial policies were not so much mor-
ally reprehensible as they were strategically inconvenient. 
This underlying apathy over the morality of apartheid was buttressed by 
the general view that African nationalism was more an emotional outburst 
than a cogent alternative to the East-West global narrative. As historian Mat-
thew Connelly and others have demonstrated, American policies during the 
period of decolonization often relied on older assumptions to support views 
on containment. In Connelly's words, "Even at the height of the Cold War, 
discourses about development and civilizational conflict helped delineate the 
shifting borders between North and South, the 'West' and 'the rest.' "2" Against 
the backdrop of African independence and the debate over apartheid, tra-
ditional white American assumptions about blacks as being backward and 
uncivilized often permeated discussions among policy makers. 30 
During a National Security Council meeting in mid-1958, for example, 
one official commented: "The Spirit of 1776 is running wild throughout 
[Africa]. The various states and colonies want independence now, whether 
they are ready for it or not." Specifically referencing Ghana's President 
Nkrumah, he called such trends "terrifying."31 During another NSC meet-
l 
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ing in 1960, Vice President Nixon commented that "some of the peoples of 
Africa have been out of the trees for only about fifty years" and suggested 
that "politically sophisticated diplomats" could easily subvert black nation-
alism and reorient "the African people toward the Free World." President 
Dwight Eisenhower argued similarly that South Africa was the only country 
in the entire continent that could actually govern itself. Relying on a binary 
that subtly undercut the logic of African nationalism, he said that African 
leaders were "putting the cart before the horse" by placing more precedence 
on political independence than economic development. 32 These views-
grounded in the vocabulary of prewar race relations-helped structure 
American assumptions about South Africa. The situation was noteworthy 
because it triggered the ire of new African countries, but beyond its symbolic 
importance many policy makers actually shared the racialist attitudes that 
buttressed the Union's policy of apartheid. 
When President Eisenhower first heard that the US Department of State 
had issued a statement expressing "regret" about the Sharpeville Massacre, 
he called a meeting with Secretary of State Christian Herter. Learning 
that the statement was made by a bureau chief working on his own accord, 
Eisenhower said that if it were his decision, he would "find another post 
for the bureau chief" and recommended that the State Department apolo-
gize immediately to the Union government. Concurring with the president's 
comments, Secretary Herter framed the statement as a "breach of courtesy 
between two nations."33 When pressure built for the UN Security Council 
to address the violence in South Africa during the following week, Eisen-
hower and Macmillan held a private meeting at Camp David to formulate 
a response. To the president's mind: "One could not sit in judgment on a 
difficult social and political problem six thousand miles away." Noting that 
the United States had its "own problem" with race and indicating his sympa-
thy with his "friends in Atlanta on some of their difficulties," the president 
promised that the Security Council resolution would "express regret about 
the disturbances" without committing the Western bloc to a serious con-
frontation with South Africa. 34 
The president's comments revealed a deeper dimension of the US approach 
toward apartheid. At the end of the Eisenhower administration, American 
society was effectively standing on the brink of its own revolution in race rela-
tions. As Mary Dudziak and Thomas Borstelmann have noted, many non-
whites viewed the ascension of John Kennedy in 1961 as the harbinger of new 
policies toward black political demands. 35 During the presidential campaign he 
not only referred to Africa as "the most important area in the world" but also 
indicated his belief that "the lands of the rising peoples" would play a critical 
role in "the defense and expansion of freedom."36 For many African national-
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ists, the central question of 1961 became whether the new president would 
back up his rhetoric with decisive action. 
The Battleground 
Indications that the debate over South Africa was entering a new stage became 
increasingly apparent as 1961 proceeded. Frustrated by Macmillan's earlier 
overtures and eager to garner more political autonomy, the Union withdrew 
from the British Commonwealth that March in order to create an independent 
republic. When it applied for reentry a few days later, several African mem-
ber states established preconditions that made its readmission contingent on 
domestic political reform. "South Africa is one of the senior members of the 
Commonwealth," Verwoerd said during a Commonwealth meeting in London 
on March 23. "No self-respecting member of any voluntary organization could 
... be expected to retain membership in what is now becoming a pressure 
group."3~ South Africa withdrew permanently the following day and began fos-
tering closer relations with Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. 
Pressures mounted again when African and Asian countries joined 
together on July 18 to force the issue of apartheid onto the agenda of the UN 
General Assembly. 3R Diplomatic warfare carried over into a resolution that 
was submitted by thirty-two African and Middle Eastern nations in October. 
Rejecting the passive language that had characterized previous resolutions 
against South Africa, the resolution proposed that all UN member states break 
their diplomatic ties with the republic, close their ports to South African ships, 
boycott South African goods, deny passage to South African aircraft, and rec-
ognize apartheid as a direct threat to "international peace and security." The 
resolution was withdrawn in November because an Indian resolution against 
South Africa garnered more support, but the events that autumn revealed that 
African nations were beginning to use their numbers to place new pressure 
on South Africa."' The United Nations and the British Commonwealth were 
becoming the diplomatic battlegrounds where African nationalists confronted 
the forces of colonialism and racism. 
The debate over whether the United Nations could take action against 
South Africa pivoted largely on an interpretation of the Charter of the United 
Nations. While Article 2(7) forbade the United Nations from "interven[ing] 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state," 
Article 14 gave the General Assembly the ability to "recommend measures 
for the peaceful adjustment of any situation ... it deems likely to impair the 
general welfare or friendly relations between nations." African nationalists 
came to believe that if they could demonstrate that South Africa represented a 
L 
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danger to "the maintenance of international peace and security," the Security 
Council would be obligated to take action under the provisions of Chapter VII, 
which outlined the Council's role in dealing with member-state aggression. 40 
In pursuing this goal, they offered a revealing twofold rationale that framed 
apartheid as both transnationally violent and innately expansionistic. In argu-
ing the first point, African nationalists consistently referred to notions of pan-
Africanism and asserted that brutality against South African blacks was a 
provocation against all Africans. Ali Mazrui, a young East African scholar 
who went on to help establish the field of African studies, framed the point 
well in a 1962 article to the Times of London. To his mind, the tendency to 
define black South Africans as "Bantu" was an epistemological byproduct of 
colonialism. "The term 'Bantu' is not territorially restrictive. And in any case 
the word 'African' has now assumed greater dignity, and is therefore preferred 
by many of the leaders of Africa." Pointing toward specific speeches by African 
leaders such as Robert Sobukwe and Kwame Nkrumah, he explained that most 
blacks now viewed their efforts "as part of a continental struggle in a more 
real sense than ever Nehru or Sukarno saw themselves as part of an Asian 
struggle." Apartheid was not just an assault against blacks in South Africa; it 
was an attack on Africa as a whole. Using a line oflogic that laid a foundation 
for what would become postmodern theory, he approached the fluidity of Afri-
can identity as "an excellent example" of how "semantics" could "create myths 
and symbols" that "changed the map of realities" at the international level. 11 
In supporting the case that apartheid was expansionistic, African 
nationalists were more concrete, drawing attention to the colonial relation-
ship between South Africa and the neighboring region of South-West Africa 
(Namibia). South Africa had been granted a League of Nations mandate over 
the region after World War I, but such ties were widely seen as illegitimate in 
the postcolonial era. In early 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia-the only African 
nations with historical connections to the League of Nations-formally chal-
lenged the basis of this mandate with litigation at the International Court of 
Justice. 42 Paul Proehl, a professor oflaw at UCLA in the 1960s, suggested at the 
time that the case was "symbolic" of the broader "confrontation between black 
and white."4 ' However, its meaning was more concrete. The South-West Africa 
case was a contest over the terms oflegitimacy in the decolonized world. And 
although the final decision was not reached until 1966, the African bloc's 
ability to win the first phase of the trial in 1962 was interpreted widely as a 
step toward changing the traditional balance between universal human rights 
and national sovereignty at the internationallevel. 14 
These initiatives did not go unnoticed by the United States. In June 1962, 
the State Department-in a policy paper entitled "The White Redoubt"-cast 
these breakthroughs in dire terms. Connecting events in South Africa directly 
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to the revolution in Algeria, officials noted that blacks now faced whites 
"across a sea of developing hate." The language used was telling: "[South 
Africa] is, in effect, a last white stronghold against black invasion from the 
north and racialist-inspired upheavals from within." 15 Like the Eisenhower 
administration, the Kennedy administration subtly cast Africans as bar-
barians at the gates of whiteness, treating the tensions in southern Africa as 
an outgrowth of black extremism rather than a byproduct of South Africa's 
system of racial injustice. During a briefing just before the General Assem-
bly in 1962, Undersecretary of State George Ball relayed this message to the 
president, saying that the United States was facing "a series of dilemmas with 
mounting pressures from the Africans and Asians for rapid solutions to the 
most complicated 'hard core' colonial problems." Although he predicted that 
support for sanctions and action in South-West Africa would expand in the 
next General Assembly, he argued that the president needed to "vigorously 
oppose" such "irresponsible" action. 16 
When Ghana and other African countries indeed submitted an expanded 
version of their 1961 resolution during the seventeenth General Assembly, 
American representatives accused them of "casting doubt on the efficacy of the 
sanction process," causing "dissension among Member States," and "seriously 
weakening the authority of the United Nations."47 A circular telegram from the 
State Department explained that while the "United States continues to favor 
the achievement of self-determination by dependent peoples throughout the 
world," the actions of anticolonial nations at the United Nations reflected an 
"unjustified doctrinaire extremism and impracticality" that was making the 
United States look "soft on colonialism."'x For Americans, it was a forum for 
establishing consensus on Cold War issues; for new anticolonial states it was a 
mechanism for transforming the existing world order. As new African nations 
grew more adept at using their numbers to shape the United Nations' political 
agenda, American officials became increasingly frustrated by their inability to 
control the terms of global politics. 
This underlying divergence expanded into a direct confrontation in 1963. In 
late May, various African governments assembled at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to 
establish the Organization of African Unity and formulate a unified front against 
apartheid. In their opening resolution, they not only reaffirmed their commitment 
to the UN resolution they had passed the previous year, but also expressed "deep 
concern" with the racial discrimination against African Americans in the United 
States. Indeed, as the American civil rights movement garnered more media atten-
tion and the US government took concrete steps toward civil rights legislation, 
African nationalists retooled their strategy toward the United States. In a meeting 
at the State Department over the status of South-West Africa, one African diplo-
mat went so far as to assert that the US government had "an obligation" to address 
L 
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the situation in the Republic of South Africa because it was willing to support civil 
rights activists in the American South. 4" 
African nationalists understood that meaningful success was contingent 
on US willingness to support the resolutions they were passing at the UN 
General Assembly. When the issue of apartheid went before the Security 
Council in August 1963, it appeared that a breakthrough might be at hand. In 
a statement before the Council that dramatically departed from previous US 
admonitions, representative Adlai Stevenson declared: 
We all suffer from the disease of discrimination in various forms, but 
at least most of us recognize the disease for what it is: a disfiguring 
blight. In many countries, governmental policies are dedicated to 
rooting out this dread syndrome of prejudice and discrimination, 
while in South Africa we see the anachronistic spectacle of the 
Government of a great people which persists in seeing the disease as 
the remedy, prescribing for the malady of racism the bitter toxic of 
apartheid. 
He went on to assert that "just as the United States was determined to wipe 
out discrimination" on its domestic front, it would "support efforts to bring 
about a change in South Africa." Acknowledging that apartheid was prevent-
ing the full independence of Africa, Stevenson's declaration was accompanied 
with a US pledge that the Security Council would help "end the sale of all mili-
tary equipment" to the republic by the end of the calendar year."' The states-
man's words represented the strongest condemnation against South Africa that 
any Western government had ever made. 
However, the new US position ignored the broader political platform of 
African nationalists and said nothing about the issue of economic sanctions. 
The true sentiment of American policy makers was captured well in private 
conversations between the summer and fall of 1963. In a meeting with the 
South African ambassador, Dr. Willem Naude, on the eve of the UN sanc-
tions debate, Secretary of State Rusk spoke frankly about attitudes within 
the Kennedy administration. Keeping his comments strictly off the record, 
Rusk admitted that the United States was willing to embrace a nonintegra-
tionist solution to South Africa's problems. "A breath-taking step has a better 
chance of success than something small and pedestrian," the secretary of state 
explained with candor. By shifting South Africa to a "federal or confederal" 
political system, whites would be able to eliminate local discrimination against 
blacks while maintaining exclusive control over "external affairs and defence." 
The South African ambassador-who interpreted this plan as a sign of "fresh 
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thinking and an abandonment of the hackneyed cliches of the New Frontier" 
-responded with enthusiasm. Writing to Pretoria the following evening, 
Naude noted that if South Africa could "present [its] situation in terms of [Mr. 
Rusk's] own terminology [it] might be able to make a great deal of 'progress' 
in getting the U.S. to understand [its] situation, without moving an inch from 
[its] declared policies." From South Africa's perspective, the overture was a 
sign that the Americans were "willing to agree-albeit reluctantly-to explore, 
if not yet to follow, [the] road of separate development" in South Africa. 51 
Such a sentiment was echoed by President Kennedy himself during an Octo-
ber meeting with British officials about African demands for economic sanctions 
against the Nationalist government. In his words, the United States had "gone 
along on the arms embargo" but "would not go beyond that and would not sup-
port sanctions." The question, to his mind, was now "how best to stop them."'2 A 
memo from the National Security Council staff later that month cast the situation 
in policy terms: "In the past several years ... we have sailed an improvised, often 
erratic course between the antagonists, with a series of minor concessions to the 
Africans as the pressures mounted, while avoiding an irreparable break with the 
... South Africans. While this has been the most sensible-indeed the only sen-
sible-course open to us, we are beginning to run out of sailing room. I think we 
can gain some space for maneuver, and continue to defer the dilemma, if we raise 
our present tactic to a deliberate, systematic policy."'' 
Shifting the Debate 
1be South African government watched the global apartheid debate with a 
mixture of anxiety and resentment. "[This] goes deeper than a 'publicity prob-
lem with political overtones,"' explained one high-ranking official in January 
1961. "[These attacks] have become a full scale international political problem 
affecting the survival of South Africa itself."'' To the minds of many Afrikaner 
elites, criticism from abroad was pushing South Africa toward economic col-
lapse. Indeed, the foreign capital that had propelled the country's manufactur-
ing growth during the postwar years evaporated rapidly in the wake of the 
Sharpeville Massacre, as global investors grew wary that unrest was a sign of a 
coming racial war. In the months that followed the riots, more than seven hun-
dred million pounds disappeared from South Africa's economy." At the end of 
1960, banking officials lamented openly that "the net outflow of capital" was 
having "an appreciably adverse effect on the country's monetary reserves and 
financial markets." To address these problems, they encouraged the govern-
ment to "exert itself in every possible way to revive the confidence of foreign 
investors."56 
l 
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Toward this end, the government vastly expanded its propaganda 
machine and implemented an ambitious "programme of action" in the 
years after Sharpeville. Hoping to transcend their difficulties at the United 
Nations, South African officials focused their attention on nongovernment 
actors and global capitalists. "This total war against South Africa is being 
waged on the publicity front," explained the director of intelligence, P. J. 
Nel, in late 1960. Stepping back from the situation, he noted resentfully that 
"when we put forward our case, our words and good intentions are doubted . 
. . . Our country is stable, our economy healthy and our people are better off 
than in other parts of the continent. We are a Christian country, democratic, 
and free from corruption. Why are we being attacked about things which 
are glossed over in ... embryonic dictatorships such as Ghana?" For Nel, the 
answer was tied to the insights of social psychology: "It is clear that the resis-
tance against our message, at least in the U.S.A., can be ascribed to hidden, 
subconscious factors."57 With the "survival" of South Africa contingent on 
economic integration with the West, the task before the South African Infor-
mation Service was clear-to attack these "subconscious factors" in tangible 
and incremental ways. 
Government officials advanced a plan that was layered and subtle. In South 
Africa, the government would begin a systematic effort of "planned internal 
press canvassing." In Nel's words: "The press should become priority num-
ber one. It was the press that conditioned the adverse popular opinion against 
South Africa; the press is the major means to be used to remedy the situation." 
Conceiving this work as the "top commitment of the Information Service of 
South Africa," he recommended the development of intimate relationships 
with "important internal correspondents" and "manageable foreign corre-
spondents." Members of the press were to be treated literally as guests of the 
Nationalist party. To reinforce the authority of the state, cabinet members and 
other officials were instructed to release information to the public through 
press conferences rather than "impersonal" news releases. For the director, 
these initiatives would not simply dampen the influence of South Africa's 
critics-they guaranteed better understanding of South Africa's race problems. 
Demanding in "the strongest terms" that this program be kept secret from 
"the press, the Parliament and the public," the director confidently asserted 
that it provided an "answer to press control."sH 
Conceived as "the first bulwark of counter-attack," this program was 
coupled with an aggressive public relations campaign in Washington, DC, and 
New York City. On one level, South Africa's goal was political. As the director 
of intelligence explained: "Everything indicates that the Kennedy regime is 
going to be strongly influenced by liberal and progressive elements. An influ-
ential P.R. man can assist us in mustering a strong group of sympathetic people 
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around Vice President Johnson and Senators Fulbright and Mansfield." On a 
deeper level, however, the South African government hoped to fundamentally 
change US perceptions of apartheid. Claiming that Americans were condi-
tioned to "accept the simplistic solution of an eventual explosion as the only 
possible outcome" in South Africa, officials turned to private organizations 
like the Institute for Motivational Research for guidance in their approach 
to propaganda. Using newly developed social science concepts and research 
methods, the Institute and its "team of Ph.D.'s" analyzed the "latent" and 
"emotional" reasons for anti-apartheid sentiment in the United States. South 
African officials embraced the organization's findings. First, many Americans 
viewed the Nationalist government as a "colonial power" in South Africa. Sec-
ond, everyday Americans tended to juxtapose the rigidity of apartheid with 
America's "progressive" approach toward race. And third, few Americans 
understood the "economic realities" of South African society. "Armed with 
these data," the director of intelligence declared, "we can now apply a strength-
ened information service with a new prospect of success and new techniques 
to swing public opinion within the foreseeable time into our favour."'" 
By 1965, the annual budget of South Africa's Information Service exceeded 
a million pounds and it was distributing periodicals, educational pamphlets, 
and propaganda movies in a variety of languages around the world, in addi-
tion to coordinating regular speaking tours by various government officials. 
On one level, the Information Agency worked to disconnect the country's 
domestic race policies from the narrative of anticolonialism. Keywords like 
"stability," "coexistence," and "self-government" permeated South African 
information pamphlets. To strengthen their case, propagandists juxtaposed 
the situation in South Africa with the supposed immaturity and volatility 
of other African nations. This effort was premised on South African excep-
tionalism: "Neither in Algeria nor in [Kenya] can the white communities 
be regarded as constituting a unique, separate and self-contained nation."(,[' 
The South Africa Digest editorialized: "It is essential to remember that the 
forces and influences that have arisen in Algeria, West Africa, the Congo, 
and East Africa are not coordinated. To believe this would be to misunder-
stand the confused, shifting and immature character of the African."61 Simi-
larly, in a speech before European capitalists, South Africa's foreign minister 
argued that economic pressures from African nations like Ghana were signs 
of "political immaturity-the sort expected from small boys or a certain 
modern type of irresponsible teenager." Unrest in places like the Congo, to 
his mind, would have a "healthy effect" on the Western world by reminding 
foreigners that "[South Africa] is the only country with the necessary knowl-
edge to ensure positive trade relations."62 Relying on highly paternalistic lan-
guage, the government tried to convince Western authorities that the rest of 
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Africa was fundamentally different from South Africa. Black African states 
were inherently "unstable" and "unpredictable," while the Union remained a 
bastion of modern capitalism. 
When addressing the unrest inside their own borders, government offi-
cials dwelled often on the specter of Communism. The African National Con-
gress had long-standing ties with the South African Communist Party, but 
few African nationalists-especially within the PAC-counted themselves 
genuine Communists in the early 1960s."3 As criticism of apartheid mounted, 
however, South African propagandists made the case that black activism and 
Communism were a singular phenomenon. "Nothing would satisfy the Com-
munists except a successful revolution in South Africa, and nothing would 
satisfy the extremist Africans except the introduction of one-man-one-vote 
into the constitution," explained an official in 1963."4 For many white South 
Africans these two dangers were interconnected. By positioning themselves 
between the Western bloc and imaginary Communist masses, government 
advocates conveyed the message that they were defenders of Western values in 
the African continent. 
Most importantly, South African propagandists lauded the merits of 
their industrial society. Nearly every propaganda item from the early 1960s 
made some reference to the country's high standard of living and complex 
manufacturing sector. The goal, according to the Information Service, was to 
"present to the world the true picture of South Africa" by focusing on themes 
like "industrial and social progress; science and education; cultural develop-
ment; opportunities for investment; tourist attractions; and the way of life 
of South Africans at work and play.""' Recognizing that colonial themes of 
white civilization no longer resonated abroad, the South African govern-
ment used concepts of industrialization and modernization to reestablish its 
place in the capitalist world. The goal was not to engage directly the African 
nationalists in a debate over apartheid, but to manipulate underlying West-
ern assumptions about blacks and emphasize the pragmatic importance of 
social stability and economic vitality. Understanding that economic integra-
tion with countries like the United States and Great Britain was the key to 
South Africa's place in the postcolonial world, Afrikaner elites worked delib-
erately outside the parameters of the United Nations to influence the nature 
of the debate on their country. Their efforts revealed important aspects of 
how the gap between older modes of "civilizational" thinking and the newer 
discourse of "modernization" was bridged in the years after the Second 
World War. Explicit racial paternalism receded from global discourse in the 
wake of decolonization, but racialist thinking still offered subtle reference 
points that helped frame economic, political, and cultural relations in the 
Cold War. 
s 
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Conclusion 
By the mid-1960s, the economy of South Africa was vibrant and strong, but 
the country was politically isolated from the world community. Although it 
remains difficult to measure the exact impact of South Africa's information 
campaign, it seems telling that the country had little difficulty receiving a 
series of loans from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in 
the early 1960s to deal with its economic downturn. According to Reserve 
Bank officials, the ability to secure such loans "indicate[d] the beginning 
of an increase in foreign confidence in the maintenance of order, stability 
and prosperity in South Africa."66 By the end of 1963, despite the Security 
Council's arms embargo and near universal condemnation of apartheid at 
the UN General Assembly, South African officials reflected that events had 
turned out "better than expected.''r' 7 The situation had demonstrated "the 
value of positive, non-political propaganda" in creating "an effect essen-
tially political.""~ On October 18, a delegation from Pretoria privately noti-
fied the US secretary of state that South Africa was "seriously and urgently" 
considering withdrawal from the United Nations. Although the Nationalist 
government had made similar declarations in the mid-1950s, its latest over-
ture was coupled with a revealing qualifier. Noting that the organization 
only embarrassed and harassed their country, representatives argued that 
withdrawal would "reduce the difficulties for certain countries with whom 
South Africa has had long and friendly ties.""9 The message was clear-
positive relations were not contingent on developments at the United Nations. 
For a unique but fleeting moment in the early 1960s, African leaders like 
Kwame Nkrumah genuinely believed they could change South Africa and 
destroy the remnants of colonialism by mobilizing support in the United 
Nations. Such confidence was inspired by the sense that a racial revolution 
was occurring around the world that placed African interests at the vanguard 
of human progress. Motivated by a set of priorities that centered on North-
South issues of white racism and economic exploitation, nationalists through-
out the Third World were similarly working from within the United Nations 
to transform world opinion and the world order. Their concerns, however, 
were not shared by dominant international actors like the United States. In 
the minds of many American leaders, the political demands of Africans and 
Asians were inconvenient outbursts that distracted from the more impor-
tant concerns of the Cold War. The inability of African countries to garner 
support for economic sanctions against South Africa at the United Nations 
exposed important realities about the limited nature of political change in the 
postcolonial era. 
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Equally important, it revealed the paradoxes that emerged as the Cold War 
superpowers supplanted traditional European empires in the years after World 
War II. Political space emerged for the articulation of alternative visions of 
world order-visions rooted in themes of racial justice, national sovereignty, 
and human rights-but actual initiatives were compromised by the impera-
tives of national security ideology and world capitalism. These points were not 
lost on people living in the Third World. By the late 1960s, as it became increas-
ingly obvious that the Afro-Asian coalition and its nationalist leaders could 
not deliver on promises of change, political momentum in southern Africa 
(as well as the Middle East and Southeast Asia) began shifting toward leaders 
outside the traditional nation-state system. By the late 1960s, with war raging 
in Vietnam, the optimism once associated with the "postcolonial moment" 
was supplanted widely by feelings of frustration and disillusionment. And the 
United States, in the minds of many, stood imaginatively as the world's cynical 
"New Empire." 
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